Clusterf!ck bomb pot (2 Viewers)

[upNdown]

true-equity-split

How does that work? You plug the hands into an equity calculator then award the appropriate percentages of the pot? How often do people go with that option?

 

[BGinGA]

How does that work? You plug the hands into an equity calculator then award the appropriate percentages of the pot? How often do people go with that option?

Exactly. Not often used, though, unless the pot is huge.

 

[jpietrella]

My rulings as host:

1. No bomb pots

2. All split-pot games are run-it-once only

3. Players may agree to run-it-once (default), run-it-thrice, true-equity-split, or just chop as-is (house rabbit-hunting rules apply) if a player is all-in in any single-pot game. Cannot run-it-twice.

Alternately, I've given some thought to allowing players to run-it-twice with a caveat that pots are never chopped:
~ hand leader wins both run-outs = scoop
~ hand trailer wins both run-outs = scoop
~ each hand wins once = leader wins 2/3 pot

LOL, wtf. I'm out.

 

[timinater]

or just chop as-is

Am I understanding this right? Extreme example, I have AA, you have KK and we can agree to chop the pot?

Or is it more like TT vs AK and we just agree to chop 50/50 rather than 55/45 and move on for the sake of expedience?

 

[BGinGA]

Am I understanding this right? Extreme example, I have AA, you have KK and we can agree to chop the pot?

Or is it more like TT vs AK and we just agree to chop 50/50 rather than 55/45 and move on for the sake of expedience?

Correct on both counts. Although pretty unlikely that AA is gonna agree to a chop unless KK has a bunch of straight/flush outs.

 

[upNdown]

Correct on both counts. Although pretty unlikely that AA is gonna agree to a chop unless KK has a bunch of straight/flush outs.

We’re getting off on a tangent here but I’ve never cared for any chop agreement between the last two guys in the pot. There’s a danger of collusion, if two guys know they can bet people out of pots and then divide up their profits. And even if they’re not colluding, it seems to go against the spirit of the game - if you bet big or call big, I think you need to live with that risk and see it through.

 

[Taghkanic]

We’re getting off on a tangent here but I’ve never cared for any chop agreement between the last two guys in the pot. There’s a danger of collusion, if two guys know they can bet people out of pots and then divide up their profits. And even if they’re not colluding, it seems to go against the spirit of the game - if you bet big or call big, I think you need to live with that risk and see it through.

I kind of agree, at least as far as the equity chop. Makes it less dangerous, say, if two colluders try to squeeze a third player.

 

[BGinGA]

We’re getting off on a tangent here but I’ve never cared for any chop agreement between the last two guys in the pot. There’s a danger of collusion, if two guys know they can bet people out of pots and then divide up their profits. And even if they’re not colluding, it seems to go against the spirit of the game - if you bet big or call big, I think you need to live with that risk and see it through.

Well, that's certainly a potential argument against running it twice (~50% chance of chopping).

But players who collude typically don't care if they win, lose, or chop with their partner -- the profits are shared afterward, so their individual stack sizes are meaningless.. Making players 'play it out' to avoid collusion is pointless.

 

[ArielVer18]

Player Z needs to be more assertive and make his case while he still has his hand. If he held onto his hole cards, the next hand cannot start.

 

[allforcharity]

I think a bomb pot every 9 to 10 hands is too often. Once an hour is our sweet spot.

We do it once an orbit! Granted, low stakes and dealer's choice.

 

[Taghkanic]

But players who collude typically don't care if they win, lose, or chop with their partner -- the profits are shared afterward, so their individual stack sizes are meaningless.. Making players 'play it out' to avoid collusion is pointless.

The third player is the one at risk.

If two colluders are squeezing a mark, their best option is obviously their combined aggression forces the mark to abandon his earlier investment(s) in the pot.

So the colluders win via fold equity on many runouts.

In the instances when the mark does not give up, the colluders at least know they are going to get rebates in the form of chop equity, if that is agreed to.

Even terrible hands tend to have some modest equity if they get them on any street before the river.

So what I was saying is that chop equity could serve as a form of insurance for colluders. Add this to their earlier fold equity and they can hardly lose except when the mark flops the absolute nuts.

 

[jpietrella]

when the mark flops the absolute nuts.

@upNdown I will now exclusively address you as "Mark" at your games.